A New Forensics: Developing Standard Remote Sensing Methodologies to Detect and Document Mass Atrocities by Raymond, Nathaniel A et al.
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal
Volume 8 | 2014 Humanitarian Technologies and
Genocide Prevention Issue 3
| Article 6
A New Forensics: Developing Standard Remote
Sensing Methodologies to Detect and Document
Mass Atrocities
Nathaniel A. Raymond
Harvard University
Brittany L. Card
Harvard University
Isaac L. Baker
Harvard University
Abstract.
Aim: The aim of this article is to highlight potential methods applicable to a standard forensic
approach for the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery that may contain evidence of alleged
mass atrocities.
Methods: The primary method employed is the retrospective analysis of a case study involving the
use of high-resolution satellite imagery analysis to document alleged mass atrocities. The case study
utilized herein is the Satellite Sentinel Project’s reporting on the May 2011 sacking of Abyei Town by
Government of Sudan-aligned armed actors. In the brief case study, categories of objects, patterns of
activities, and types of alleged mass atrocity events are applied the Abyei Town incident.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raymond, Nathaniel A.; Card, Brittany L.; and Baker, Isaac L. (2014) "A New Forensics: Developing Standard Remote Sensing
Methodologies to Detect and Document Mass Atrocities," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 8: Iss. 3:
33-48.
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.3.4
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol8/iss3/6
Results: Categories of activity patterns, visible phenomena, and relevant objects leaned from the
Abyei Town case study may provide a scalable example of how accepted forensic standards for
remote sensing analysis of alleged mass atrocities may be further developed.
Conclusions: The methods and frameworks applied in this research to the Abyei Town case study
should be tested and refined through further case studies. The sources of these case studies may be
both past reports by civil society, governments, and international judicial bodies and new analyses of
previously unanalyzed high-resolution satellite imagery of alleged mass atrocities.
Keywords.
Satellite, imagery, forensic science, pedagogy, mass atrocities, human rights, remote sensing, Sudan,
war crimes, analysis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
Nathaniel A. Raymond, Brittany L. Card and Isaac L. Baker, “A New Forensics: Developing Standard Remote Sensing Methodologies to 
Detect and Document Mass Atrocities,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, 3 (Fall 2014): 33-48. ©2014 Genocide Studies and Prevention. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.3.4
A New Forensics: Developing Standard Remote Sensing Methodologies 
to Detect and Document Mass Atrocities
Nathaniel A. Raymond
Signal Program on Human Security and Technology
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
Harvard School of Public Health
Cambridge, MA, USA
http://hhi.harvard.edu/
Brittany L. Card 
Signal Program on Human Security and Technology
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
Harvard School of Public Health
Cambridge, MA, USA
http://hhi.harvard.edu/
Isaac L. Baker 
Signal Program on Human Security and Technology
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
Harvard School of Public Health
Cambridge, MA, USA
http://hhi.harvard.edu/
Abstract: 
Aim: The aim of this article is to highlight potential methods applicable to a standard forensic approach for the analysis of 
high-resolution satellite imagery that may contain evidence of alleged mass atrocities.
Methods: The primary method employed is the retrospective analysis of a case study involving the use of high-resolution 
satellite imagery analysis to document alleged mass atrocities. The case study utilized herein is the Satellite Sentinel Project’s 
reporting on the May 2011 sacking of Abyei Town by Government of Sudan-aligned armed actors. In the brief case study, 
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Results: Categories of activity patterns, visible phenomena, and relevant objects leaned from the Abyei Town case study may provide 
a scalable example of how accepted forensic standards for remote sensing analysis of alleged mass atrocities may be further developed.
Conclusions: The methods and frameworks applied in this research to the Abyei Town case study should be tested and refined 
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MARS: The Application of Remote Sensing to Mass Atrocity Contexts
Prior to the United States Government allowing the commercial sale of high-resolution satellite imagery 
in the early 1990’s, high-spatial resolution1 (afterwards, “high-resolution”) satellite imagery was almost solely 
available only to governments, their militaries, and their intelligence agencies.2 This change in policy has 
enabled NGOs and international agencies to begin employing this specific type of remote sensing technology 
to document alleged mass atrocity events.3 
The use of high-resolution satellite imagery analysis to document mass atrocity events, which is referred 
to hereafter as Mass Atrocity Remote Sensing (MARS), has demonstrated utility for these groups.4  Remote 
sensing can provide unique, sometimes otherwise unavailable, information about events occurring in extremely 
non-permissive environments,5 over large geographic areas, and across long and multiple timeframes. 
Regions where mass atrocity events occur are typically inaccessible to outside observers, particularly civil 
society groups and international agencies.  
There are several distinct applications for MARS involving the analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery, 
including retrospective documentation of events for accountability and advocacy purposes;6 detection of 
potential indicators that a mass atrocity may soon occur;7 and as a data source for researching historical activity 
34
©2014      Genocide Studies and Prevention 8, no. 3  http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.8.3.4
Raymond, Card and Baker
patterns that may occur during certain armed conflicts.8 Some advocacy organizations currently employing 
MARS to document specific types of mass atrocities include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
the Enough Project, and Physicians for Human Rights.  Reports released by these organizations have focused 
on nations that include Syria, Sudan, Nigeria, Burma, and Central African Republic.9
Academic research institutions also conduct high-resolution satellite imagery analysis of alleged atrocity 
events, and their research has helped support the adoption of these tools and methods by civil society groups. 
Notable examples of these types of research centers include the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science’s (AAAS) Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights Project10 and the Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative’s (HHI) Signal Program on Human Security and Technology.11
International agencies and governments are involved in this type of work as well.  The United Nations 
Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) is a leading example of the increased use of remote 
sensing by international agencies in potential mass atrocity producing contexts.12 UNOSAT has provided 
analysis of imagery, generated maps, and created other products related to the mass displacement of civilian 
populations in South Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere.13 Recently, the United States Department of State’s 
Humanitarian Information Unit has started releasing commercial imagery of alleged mass atrocity events to 
voluntary technical organizations, NGOs, and other civil society groups.14 Examples of MARS-relevant data 
released so far by the US State Department through this initiative include commercial imagery captured over 
Syria, among other locations, where armed conflict is ongoing.15
Additionally, intelligence services and other executive agencies of various national governments, including 
the European Union16 and the United States’ intelligence community, are increasingly expressing public interest 
in improving mass atrocity Early Warning Early Response (EWER) capabilities.17 The full scope of the interest 
and investment of these agencies in MARS applications, however, is difficult to fully assess, in part, due to the 
classified nature of some of these activities.  
In the past approximately twenty years, MARS-type analyses of high-resolution remote sensing data, including 
aerial reconnaissance photography, have been admitted as evidence in cases before the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), amongst other national and international venues.18  However, it can be argued that civil society’s 
use of high-resolution remote sensing specific to the mass atrocity context is still very much a recent development.
The MARS Methodology Gap
Despite the growing number of organizations engaged in this space, little formal pedagogy specific to 
this emerging field exists. Thus, efforts to professionalize and standardize the application of remote sensing in 
the context of mass atrocities has lagged behind the pace at which organizations are adopting this technology 
for these purposes. Analysts using these technologies have little documented past practice to draw upon.
The net result is that MARS practitioners are currently without accepted forensic standards specific to 
corroborating through primarily remotely observed phenomena whether an alleged mass atrocity has likely 
occurred.19 This core gap is the result, in part, of little extant research intentionally treating MARS as its own 
distinct discipline within remote sensing, with its own distinct operational challenges and requirements.
As a consequence, MARS appears to most often be applied by organizations to create incident specific 
analysis products. These products may aim to enhance current situational awareness or support advocacy 
efforts to shift public opinion and policy around a particular issue.20 Few current MARS products, however, 
appear specifically intended to create generalizable knowledge leading to the development of standard 
methodologies for applying MARS across incidental and regional contexts.  
Some analysis techniques originally developed for military intelligence purposes (known as “geospatial 
intelligence” or “GEOINT”) that are relevant to MARS work can sometimes be gleaned from both unclassified 
and declassified United States Government imagery and analysis products.21 While of general value to the 
MARS field, past GEOINT practices alone are not enough of an antecedent to develop standard theoretical 
and methodological approaches to MARS work. 
Publicly available GEOINT examples rarely include previous analyses of mass atrocity incidents.  A 
notable exception is declassified satellite imagery and aerial reconnaissance photography related to the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre.  This imagery was later released after it was used as evidence exhibits in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.22 The Srebrenica images are unique in this regard. 
Original, cross contextual MARS-specific research will thus be required if analysts are to learn what 
potentially observable objects and corresponding activity patterns involving those objects may be detectable 
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through remote sensing. Additionally, this research should seek to understand the unique identifiable 
characteristics of activity patterns that may generally occur during mass atrocity events within certain regions 
(i.e., East Africa, Middle East, North Africa, etc.) and environments (i.e., desert, savannah, mountains, urban 
settings, etc.). Research should prioritize geographic areas and contexts where past experience demonstrates 
mass atrocity events are more likelyto occur.23
A New Forensics of Remotely Observed Objects and Activity Patterns
MARS-relevant patterns should be based upon certain repeating observable objects (i.e., military 
vehicles, newly razed buildings, shell craters, etc.) and phenomena involving these objects and features 
(i.e., apparent troop movements, infrastructure construction patterns, indiscriminate bombardment, civilian 
displacement, house-to-house searches, etc.) found in some form across these contexts and regions. These 
observable objects and phenomena may be visible either prior to a mass atrocity event occurring, during 
the alleged perpetration of a mass atrocity event by armed actors, or as a result of changes to objects and the 
surrounding physical environment after a mass atrocity event has allegedly occurred. 
This task is complicated, though, by the fact that the remote collection of evidence from alleged mass 
scale crimes requires its own unique set of criminalistics (i.e., scientific methods for collecting and analyzing 
evidence). Currently, there are no established criminalistics for MARS.24 The establishment of criminalistics 
for MARS will likely be based on indicators and phenomena that have few antecedents in both traditional 
criminal forensics and what can be learned from non-classified examples of GEOINT.  
The lack of previous antecedents for this type of forensic analysis is partly due to the fact that MARS 
practitioners analyze events occurring within areas of interest (AOI) that can encompass several thousand square 
kilometers and across timeframes spanning several days, months, or even years. Thus, a new discipline of remote 
forensic analysis specific to the evolving MARS field must be developed from the integration of several sources 
of past practice. These sources of applicable past practice may include, though are not limited to, the following 
fields: Remote sensing analysis of environmental factors, photogrammetry, crime scene investigation by law 
enforcement agencies, and military and intelligence approaches to geospatial intelligence collection and analysis. 
To develop a forensic science tailored to support MARS applications, a common approach for identifying 
and classifying examples of activity patterns comprised of certain observable objects with potential probative 
value should be identified, tested, and subjected to peer review.  This approach should draw on the growing 
body of public, incident specific reports, like those mentioned above, that are being generated in recent years 
by NGOs, academic researchers, and international agencies. 
In time, legal standards of what constitutes potential evidence of specific mass atrocities could likely be 
cross-referenced and integrated with these case studies for the purposes of identifying and agreeing evidence 
examples.  Eventually, best practices for MARS evidence collection, annotation, and storage may be able to be 
developed from that resulting corpus of evidence examples. 
This paper, however, solely addresses only one of the methodological and pedagogical gaps mentioned 
above. That gap is the absence of a standard approach for the classification of phenomena involving observable 
objects into categories of activity patterns relevant to certain mass atrocity events.  
The analysis of one case study—the alleged May 2011 razing of Abyei town by Sudan Armed Forces—
is examined within this article. The case study data is derived from the reports of the Satellite Sentinel 
Project25 and the HHI Signal Program study, “Sudan: Anatomy of a Conflict.”26 The goal of the case study is to 
demonstrate a potential framework for approaching the challenge of standard identification and classification 
of MARS-related activity patterns and observable objects.  
Though specific to objects and patterns common to the context of armed conflict in East Africa, the authors 
intend for the framework to be of broader value outside Sudan and similar nations. It is expected that this initial 
approach may likely have some relevance for MARS practitioners conducting analyses of alleged mass atrocities 
across diverse regional and operational contexts. Other similar case studies from different regions, timeframes, 
and/or operational contexts may aid in refining and scaling this evolving methodology for general use.
Case Study: The Alleged May 2011 Razing of Abyei Town by Government of Sudan-Aligned Forces 
In January 2011, the people of the nation that is now South Sudan voted in a referendum to overwhelmingly 
secede from Sudan.  A bloody, decades long civil war between Sudan and southern Sudan ended with the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The accord provided an opportunity for the southern part of 
the nation to vote on self-determination.27  In July 2011, South Sudan officially became the world’s newest nation.  
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However, the CPA did not resolve the final status of the Abyei Administrative Area, a region straddling a 
long-contested border area between Sudan and South Sudan.  Thus, at the time of the January 2011 referendum, 
Abyei residents technically belonged to both West Kordofan state, Sudan and Bahr-el-Ghazal, a state in what 
is now South Sudan.28
The majority of Abyei’s population is from the Ngok Dinka, a southern Sudan-aligned ethnic group, 
who inhabit the region’s largest city, Abyei Town, as well as most of the area immediately surrounding it.  The 
second largest ethnic group present the region is the Misseriya, an Arab ethnic group traditionally aligned 
with Sudan.  The Misseriya, semi-nomadic pastoralists, move seasonally into the Abyei region to graze their 
cattle via a series of traditional migration routes, known as murhals.29
A referendum to resolve the status of the Abyei region was originally scheduled for around the same time 
as the vote to decide the future of southern Sudan.  Ordered by a decision from the Hague-based Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2009, the referendum was intended to peacefully resolve the tensions between 
Sudan and the then southern Sudanese.30  
However, the PCA decision was not implemented due to disputes over Sudan’s insistence that the Misseriya, 
who are seasonal residents, be allowed to vote in the referendum.31  Towards the end of 2010 and in the spring 
of 2011, clashes broke out between the Misseriya and southern Sudanese-aligned forces inside the Abyei region, 
leading to the destruction of villages and the forced displacement of primarily Ngok Dinka civilians.32
Forces aligned with both Sudan and southern Sudan took up positions inside the Abyei region, 
constructing fortifications and hardening their emplacements.  It was during this time that Sudanese regular 
forces, in addition to Misseriya militias apparently already operating within Abyei, began to build-up their 
strength at bases inside Sudanese territory.  These tanks, planes, infantry, and other units were arrayed within 
air and ground strike range of Abyei Town.33
The tense situation, which had been punctuated for months by seemingly isolated incidents of violence, 
devolved into an all-out invasion of Abyei Town by Sudanese forces.  Following a shootout between Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) at the Dokura checkpoint on the night 
of May 19, 2011, SAF engaged in artillery bombardment of SPLA positions at Todach and Tajalei, areas to the 
north of Abyei Town proper on May 20.34
Figure 1. Map of the Abyei Administrative Area.
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By the end of the next day, May 21, Abyei Town was firmly in the control of SAF-aligned forces. 
Over 30,000 residents of the town had fled.  Houses were on fire.  Misseriya militia and SAF forces allegedly 
moved freely throughout Abyei Town, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers, looting and burning civilian 
property on a large scale.35  
Over the next few days, more than a third of all standing structures in Abyei Town were razed, the 
World Food Programme compound was looted, and the central market was destroyed.36 Four senior former 
prosecutors and US State Department war crimes officials would later determine that the actions of SAF-
aligned forces during the Abyei Town incident potentially rose to the level of war crimes.37 
Categories of Observable Objects Likely Relevant to the May 2011 Abyei Incident
The following observable objects, or “observables”, may often be observed using remotely sensed 
imagery in the context of other rural and semi-urban East African armed conflict settings, including 
the ongoing conflict in Darfur, Sudan.38 The 2011 razing of Abyei Town in the disputed Abyei Region 
bordering Sudan and South Sudan, the case study in this article, falls within this specific context. Some 
likely techniques a MARS analyst would employ to identify (or “type”) these observables are included for 
each category of object as well.
The table below is based on data solely from the Signal Program for Human Security and Technology 
at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s (HHI) 2013 satellite imagery-based study, Sudan: Anatomy of a 
Conflict. It is specific to that study’s section on the alleged May 2011 razing of Abyei Town by Government of 
Sudan-aligned forces (GoS).39
While these observables are common in multiple East African MARS settings, the table is not meant to 
be exhaustive, nor are all examples inclusive to the context of the Abyei Town incident.40 The table is intended 
to both serve as a practice example of a MARS specific observable object and typing chart, as well as a resource 
to inform the interpretation of imagery examples later in the case study.  
Table 1. MARS-Relevant Observables and Corresponding Typing Methods (Alleged Razing of Abyei Town 
by Sudan-Aligned Forces, May 2011)
MARS-Relevant Observables Typing Methods
VEHICLES: 
●	 Military-use ground vehicles (i.e., tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, heavy transport 
trucks, water and fuel tankers, etc.) 
●	 Civilian-use ground vehicles (i.e., Land 
cruisers, lorries, etc.) 
○	 NGO/UN branded vehicles
○	 Fuel, water transport tankers
○	 Livestock transport vehicles
○	 Earthmovers (i.e., backhoes and road 
graders)
●	 Dimensions, color patterns, and unique features 
of an object can be compared with publicly 
available databases, such as Jane’s reference 
materials (hereafter, “DCU comparison”).
●	 Observable Object Context Analysis (hereafter, 
“OOC Analysis”): The context in which specific 
observable objects repeatedly appear can often 
help indicate their identity and/or current 
use (i.e., Presence of white, uniformly shaped 
vehicles at a known hospital may likely be 
ambulances, etc.).
AIRCRAFT: 
●	 Fixed wing (i.e., fighter jets, transport planes, 
bombers, etc.)
●	 Rotary wing (i.e., attack helicopters, transport 
helicopters, etc.)
●	 DCU Comparison.
●	 OOC Analysis.
●	 Measurement of runway length to help 
determine minimum takeoff and landing 
requirements for aircraft present.
ARTILLERY:
●	 Towed artillery (i.e., Howitzers,  other large 
caliber ordnance that can be pulled behind a 
vehicle)
●	 Mechanized tube artillery (i.e., multiple 
launch rocket systems, etc.) 
●	 Fixed artillery (i.e., large, long-range weapons 
that are not mobile)
●	 DCU Comparison.
●	 Presence of “V” shape at back of long, gun-
shaped weapon consistent with towed artillery.
●	 Object placement in circular depression (also 
called an “artillery berm”).
●	 Position of “gun barrel” feature on the object 
changes over time.
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MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE:
●	 Permanent encampments (i.e., major bases, 
including unit headquarters, containing more 
permanent buildings and infrastructure)
●	 Temporary encampments (i.e., forward 
operating bases created as part of operations, 
fortifications, groups of tents, etc.)
●	 Air bases (i.e., airstrips, aprons, hangars, 
logistical support buildings and equipment, 
fuel tanks, air traffic control, and 
communications towers, etc.)
●	 Presence of external and/or internal security 
perimeters comprised of trenches, berms, 
checkpoints, guard towers, fences, wooden 
corrals, or fighting positions (“foxholes”).
●	 OOC analysis of military vehicles in and 
around structures, perimeters, etc.
●	 Visible communications infrastructure, 
including radio towers, satellite dishes, etc.
●	 Potential housing, supply and logistics 
buildings (i.e., barracks, motor pools, ammo 
dumps, external water and fuel tanks, etc.).
●	 Tents of various shapes, colors, sizes, and 
arrangements.
CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE:
●	 Civilian dwellings
○	 Tukuls (traditional huts)
○	 Metal roof structures
●	 Water points (including catchment basins, 
boreholes, water towers/tanks)
●	 Agriculture
○	 Fields
○	 Orchards
○	 Irrigation infrastructure
●	 Markets
●	 Religious sites
○	 Mosques
○	 Churches
●	 Hospitals/clinics, schools
●	 Tukuls: Circular mud and thatch structures 
with cone shaped roofs, often surrounded 
by a some form of corral or other enclosure 
composed of brush.
●	 Non-tukul structures consistent with civilian 
dwellings: Square/rectangular buildings with 
reflective roofs, presence of corrals, walls, or 
other enclosures.
●	 Water points, etc.: Gathering of animals, 
crowds around standing water, enclosure with 
large basin or pump house, etc.
●	 Agriculture: Visible evidence of cultivation, 
presence of nearby trenching (i.e., possible 
irrigation), trees arrayed in rows, etc.
●	 Market: Presence of irregular stalls with metal, 
tarp, and/or fabric roofs; livestock holding 
areas; gathering of vehicles.
●	 Religious sites:  Mosques may or may not have 
visible minaret structures present, dome, or 
Mecca-facing orientation. Churches may or 
may not have visible steeples.  In both cases, 
non-imagery data corroboration is required.
●	 Hospitals/clinics, schools:  These and other 
similar structures require non-imagery data 
corroboration.  Though features present in 
imagery may support identification, none 
of these features are usually dispositive by 
themselves. 
HUMANITARIAN INFRASTRUCTURE:
●	 Humanitarian agency compounds
○	 Warehouses
○	 Administrative Buildings/Tents
○	 Motor pools
●	 Displaced persons camps 
○	 Tents 
○	 Water and Sanitation infrastructure
○	 NGO/UN vehicles
○	 IDP/Refugee built housing (i.e., tarp and/
or stick huts)
Humanitarian compounds and/or displaced persons 
camps may be characterized by some or all of the 
following features:
●	 Presence of uniform colored vehicles (usually 
white Land Cruiser-type).
●	 Uniform or similar shaped temporary 
structures (i.e., tents) with agency logos 
sometimes visible on roof. 
●	 Large numbers of tarp and/or stick based 
structures (with or without corrals).
●	 Apparent WASH (Water, Sanitation, and
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Hygiene) infrastructure (either stockpiled 
or deployed), including tanker vehicles, 
washrooms/shower houses, water storage 
vessels, etc.
●	 Helipad and/or airstrip with white painted 
fixed wing transport, rotary, or other aircraft.
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE:
●	 Roads
●	 Bridges
●	 Bus stations/transit centers
●	 Roads: Presenting as dirt tracks, surfaced (i.e., 
paved) roads, or as elevated dirt tracks (i.e., 
roads built-up out of compressed earth).
●	 Bridges: Can be concrete or metal structures 
present over rivers.
●	 Bus stations/transit centers:  Characterized by 
the routine presence of buses, transport vehicles, 
often located in towns/cities of larger size.
Primary Imagery Analysis Methods for Identifying Mass Atrocity-Related Activity Patterns
MARS analysts may use multiple accepted remote sensing analysis methods, either individually or 
in combination, to identify observable objects and apparent patterns of activity involving those objects. 
Of particular importance to the MARS analyst is the observation of changes to the physical environment over 
time.  These observations can occur based on the analysis of one or more satellite images of one or more AOIs 
over a timeframe of days, months, or years. 
Analysts attempt to draw probabilistic inferences about the potential causal and/or correlative 
relationships between the absence, presence, or change in position of observable objects and changes to the 
physical environment of an area.  Three methods, in particular, are useful for analyzing activity patterns and 
attempting to understand their significance:
• Multi-temporal Change Detection: Multi-temporal change detection involves the comparison of 
two or more images of the same area captured at different times.41 The analyst will attempt to 
detect differences in the coloration, visual properties, presence, absence, and/or position of objects 
across the images, drawing inferences from those changes. This analysis is often performed with 
the support of imagery analysis software, such as ERDAS Imagine or other computer programs.42
• Multispectral Analysis: Multispectral images are satellite images that capture more than one 
wavelength (or band) of electromagnetic energy.43 A commonly used multispectral band is near-
infrared (NIR), which is most often used for detecting changes to vegetation, especially ground 
cover, in a satellite image.44 This approach is especially helpful in seeing vehicle tracks, such as 
tank or tire tread marks. 
• Non-imagery Data Cross-Referencing: Whenever possible, imagery is cross-referenced with non-
imagery data to help identify observables, provide context to their behavior and disposition, or to 
help identify the potential AOI itself.  Non-imagery data may include history of past conflict, the 
affiliation of armed actors, and relationships between ethnic or religious groups. There are many 
sources of non-imagery data in MARS contexts that may be cross-referenced with imagery.  Some 
of the most common include news articles, reports from NGOs and international agencies, such 
as the UN, crowd sourced map data, and even the public statements of the alleged perpetrators 
themselves.  It is optimal for MARS analysts to structure their collection of non-imagery data by 
its spatio-temporal metadata (i.e., place and time information common to each report) to more 
effectively integrate these streams with remote sensing data.
Factors Affecting the Identification of Objects and Activity Patterns
The analysis of remote sensing data of an object alone does not allow an analyst to scientifically reach 
a level of absolute certainty as to the definitive identity of that object, nor to the nature of its status and/or 
activity at the time the image was captured.  An object or phenomenon present in remote sensing data can, 
at most, only be “consistent with” the known visual properties that object is believed to have when apparently 
visible in a satellite image.45 
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Thus, identifying MARS-related objects (and the activity patterns which they comprise) to the highest 
level of probabilistic certainty possible depends, in large part, on three interdependent sets of factors.  These 
factors can affect—both negatively and positively—the degree to which an analyst can reach the highest level 
of probabilistic certainty possible: 
A) Available Data: The volume, quality, and potential relevance of both imagery and non-imagery 
data available to the MARS practitioner related to the area of interest required to identify the 
presence of the visual properties consistent with these objects and patterns;
B) Technology: Certain MARS-relevant objects and patterns may or may not be detected through 
available remote sensing technologies and analysis methodologies across any or all operational 
contexts and situations;
C) Relevance: An analyst’s understanding of what objects and patterns are potentially relevant to 
MARS analysis, including the visual characteristics and properties of the objects comprising 
those patterns.
First, it is the interplay of these three sets of factors that often determine what observable objects present in 
imagery an analyst may be able to reliably identify. Second, the interaction of these factors also help determine 
what inferences and insights about the potential activity of those objects an analyst may be able to draw.  
Lastly, these factors also impact the degree to which a MARS analyst may or may not be able to connect 
any apparent activity patterns to any specific types of alleged mass atrocities that may be detectable through 
remote sensing. To assess and mitigate how these factors may affect the quality and accuracy of analysis, 
analysts should be fluent in the basic technical capabilities and expected limitations of publicly available 
remote sensing technologies.
Limitations of Remote Sensing Technologies
Until June 2014, the highest resolution of publicly available (i.e., non-classified) satellite imagery 
accessible to civilian actors is approximately 50 centimeters.46  At this resolution, analysts can expect to 
reliably identify, or “type”, certain categories of commonly repeating objects the size of vehicles, buildings, 
and major infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, through satellite imagery analysis. Crowds of 
livestock and people can sometimes be visible, though the exact composition, size, and object type of 
these crowd configurations cannot be reliably determined. Additionally, “micro interactions”, such as 
the movement of small groups of individuals and the positioning of small weapons, cannot be reliably 
identified and tracked. 
However, it must be noted, that both the quality of imagery, the number of recent and/or relevant 
images of an AOI available (known as “temporal resolution”),47 and the level of corroborating non-imagery 
data available to the MARS analyst are dynamics that may also determine whether an observable object 
can be typed. Multiple factors outside of the analyst’s control determine the overall quality of a high-
resolution satellite image. 
These factors may include, though are not limited to, the angle at which the satellite was positioned when 
the image was captured (known as “off-nadir angle”);48 the position of the sun overhead at the time of the 
image (known as “solar azimuth angle”);49 the presence of clouds, smoke or other particulate matter in the air 
at the time the image was taken; and the degree to which seasonal variables effect the presence of trees, ground 
cover vegetation, and other flora that may obscure objects present in the image.50  
Cross-referencing imagery with all available potentially relevant non-imagery data is necessary. 
Corroborating analytic conclusions about objects and other phenomena present in an image rarely can occur 
based on imagery alone. Some of these sources of non-imagery data useful for corroboration of imagery 
analysis can include eyewitness testimony, news articles and other open source reports from NGOs.
Data with probative value for MARS analysis may also be gleaned from ethnographic studies of 
populations present within the AOI.  Past studies of regionally and culturally specific macro trends related to 
armed conflicts, economic development, and population movements may also be of value.
One of the defining features of MARS analysis is its inherently interdisciplinary nature, as the diverse 
sets of factors listed above demonstrate.  Thus, practitioners are often faced with a heterogeneous mixture of 
potentially relevant data, often in several languages.  These diverse streams of data may require simultaneous 
application of multiple mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze them. 
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Additionally, predictable situational variables across regional, operational, and environmental contexts 
of MARS analysis must also be taken into account. Identifying these variables can help analysts anticipate 
and acquire the potential sources of imagery and non-imagery data that may be required to apply MARS to 
a specific regional context.
Repeating Situational Variables Across MARS Contexts
Each potential MARS context is shaped by its own particular set of dynamic variables.  However, most of 
these variables can be isolated into distinct categories and anticipated to some degree. Categories of situational 
variables repeating across MARS contexts may include the following:
• Natural Environment: Climate type and seasonal variations can affect MARS analysis 
significantly.  Deserts, for example, have higher visibility than jungles due to having little to no 
tree canopy. Additionally, regionally specific rainy seasons can cause major changes in ground 
vegetation, and their corresponding cloud cover may severely restrict the use of space-based 
sensors during that period;
• Civilian Disposition: Assessing the disposition of civilian populations that are potential targets 
of alleged mass atrocities is a critical consideration. These dispositions can include sedentary 
agrarian, urban industrial, semi-nomadic, or fully nomadic pastoralist.  In some cases, multiple 
dispositions can be found within one geographic area or ethnic group; 
• Civilian Livelihoods: Understanding how different civilian populations with different dispositions 
support themselves is key to evaluating if they have been targeted for attack.  Contextually specific 
observable objects may be likely indicators of intentional attacks against that population. For 
example, agrarian civilian populations that cultivate crops may have those crops intentionally 
burned if attacked. Apprehending these likely indicators helps analysts identify potential activity 
patterns consistent with specific types of mass atrocity events (i.e., indiscriminate bombardment, 
forced displacement, destruction and looting of civilian property, etc.);
• Armed Actors:  Potential armed actors present in MARS contexts can vary significantly across 
scenarios.  Often, multiple force types are present at once. There are two primary categories for the 
varying force types of armed actors: Regular and irregular. Regular forces are the standing military 
and/or security services of a nation state. Irregular forces are not members of organized military 
or security services, and can include rebel groups, militias, mercenaries, mobs, paramilitary 
forces, and other non-state fighters. 
• Force Profile:  Conducting an assessment of the mean (or baseline) military capability of both 
regular and irregular forces specific to a MARS context is critical for building a force profile of 
different armed actors. A force profile of each armed actor in a MARS context is important to 
have for two reasons.  First, understanding the unique capabilities of one force versus another 
provides important circumstantial data that helps differentiate what unit may have perpetrated 
an alleged mass atrocity event. For example, tanks appear in a recently attacked village that had 
been previously controlled by a force that does not possess tanks. An analyst may be able to 
more fully corroborate the identity of the attackers if they can show that the force hostile to 
that village’s population is known to have those particular types of tanks in its arsenal. Secondly, 
understanding the force profile for each force helps analysts identify units consistent with the 
capabilities of that force in the field. For example, an analyst can use his or her assessment of 
the mean military capability of a force to attempt to track the movements of observable objects 
consistent with that assessment over time.  
Inferred Observable Object Activity Patterns and Evidence of Alleged Perpetrator Actions
In the table below, three apparent categories of actions by GoS-aligned forces, the alleged perpetrators 
of the May 2011 attack on Abyei Town, are broken down across four categories.  These categories are based 
on the observable objects outlined in the table above, their apparent activity patterns, unique phenomena 
that helps corroborate the perpetrator’s apparent action, and the analysis methods that could likely be used to 
interpret the imagery data.
Previously analyzed DigitalGlobe imagery by HHI’s Signal Program provides examples of each of the 
three alleged perpetrator actions.  Additionally, explanatory notes, based on the HHI study, Sudan Anatomy 
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Table 2. MARS Indicators and Activity Patterns Consistent with Alleged Perpetrator Actions (Alleged 
Razing of Abyei Town by Sudan-Aligned Forces, May 2011)
Alleged Perpetrator 
Action
Observable Object 
Indicators
Apparent Activity 
Patterns
Unique Corroborating 
Phenomena Analysis Methods
1. Apparent 
Intentional 
Targeting of 
Civilian Populations 
and  Forced 
Displacement
Destroyed 
structures 
consistent with 
civilian dwellings, 
civilian-use 
facilities.
Dismounted actors 
(i.e., on foot) moved 
building to building 
burning and/or 
breaking apart 
structures. 
Absence of ground 
burn pattern between 
the razed structures 
is consistent 
with intentional 
destruction of 
buildings.
Primary: Multi-
temporal change 
detection.
Secondary: Non-
imagery data cross-
reference for reports 
of attacks and 
displacement.
2. Apparent 
Targeting of 
Humanitarian 
Facilities, Looting 
of Civilian Property 
and Humanitarian 
Supplies
Irregular shaped 
objects consistent 
with debris 
appears in vicinity 
of structures 
consistent with 
civilian-use/
humanitarian 
agency 
infrastructure.  
Buildings may be 
either razed or still 
appear intact.
Dismounted actors 
haphazardly moved 
and ransacked items 
originally within the 
structures outside 
of the structures.  
Often this results in 
the division of items 
amongst a group of 
alleged perpetrators, 
sometimes as 
payment for their 
actions. 
The sudden 
appearance of piles of 
items, humanitarian 
goods (i.e., food 
sacks, etc.), and other 
unknown objects in 
an area known to 
have been recently 
assaulted by an armed 
force.  Additionally, 
presence of irregular 
objects in transport 
vehicles moving away 
from area towards 
friendly territory may 
be consistent with 
looting.
Primary: Multi-
temporal change 
detection. 
Secondary: Non-
imagery data cross 
referencing and 
object typing of any 
uniform objects, 
particularly UN or 
ICRC (International 
Committee of the 
Red Cross) standard 
use items, such as 
food sacks; cross-
reference reports of 
attacks.
3. Apparent Forcible 
Military Control of 
Area (i.e., Invasion 
by Hostile Actor)
Observable objects 
are dependent on 
force profile of 
suspected aggressor 
force.  These objects 
may include, heavy 
armor vehicles 
(i.e., tanks), light 
armor vehicles (i.e., 
APCs, armored 
cars, etc.), artillery, 
Land Cruiser-
type vehicles, 
and/or evidence 
of dismounted 
units (i.e., tents, 
crowds assembled 
in formations, 
checkpoints).
Rapid movement 
of mixed vehicles 
into an area, which 
may or may not 
include either fire 
support operations 
by air assets and/or 
artillery.  Forces also 
likely engaged in 
operations to secure 
area and conduct 
searches, resulting in 
checkpoints, vehicle 
patrols on side 
streets, etc.                  
Sudden appearance of 
multiple observable 
objects consistent 
with the known force 
profile of an armed 
actor in an area that 
they previously did 
not control.  Analysts 
should expect to see 
vehicle track patterns 
on and around main 
roads, cratering, and 
other evidence of 
combat operations. 
Other activity patterns 
consistent with other 
alleged perpetrator acts 
are likely occurring 
at this time (i.e., 
looting, destruction of 
building, etc.).  
Primary: Multi-
temporal change 
detection; 
Observable object 
context (OOC) 
analysis; and 
dimensions, color 
patterns, and unique 
features (DCU) 
analysis.  
Secondary: Non-
imagery data cross-
referencing reports 
of force movement.
of a Conflict, are included to explicate the analytic process apparently employed. Each imagery example has 
the number of the relevant alleged perpetrator action that appears to have occurred.
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Imagery captured on 26 May 2011 (Figure 2), soon after the Government of Sudan-aligned forces’ 
invasion into Abyei Town, shows evidence consistent with the majority of the main market area having 
been burned.  The activity pattern is characterized in part by the lack of scorch marks between many of the 
buildings.  The apparent trend of burned structures with uniform gaps in the scorched earth between groups 
of them is consistent with the intentional destruction of this area by likely dismounted forces.  This pattern of 
destruction was further corroborated by publicly released ground photographs taken during that time51 and 
by a UN report.52
11 February 2011. QuickBird-2 satellite.
Figure 2. Apparent Intentional Destruction of Civilian Property, Targeting of Civilian Populations, and 
Forced Displacement. (Alleged Perpetrator Actions 1 and 2). Images courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
Approximately 30 percent of Abyei Town’s apparent civilian dwellings, many of them tukuls, traditional 
circular mud and thatch huts, appear to have been razed during the invasion.53 The lack of scorched 
earth between the tukuls and other apparent civilian structures is indicative of intentional burning by 
dismounted forces (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Intentional Targeting of Civilian Populations and Forced Displacement. 
(Alleged Perpetrator Action 1). Image courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite. 
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This image shows the World Food Programme’s storage facility, located in central Abyei Town (Figure 2.2). 
In the image captured after the SAF invasion, two tent-like structures are no longer visible and shelves appear 
overturned in the center of the facility. Activity consistent with looting can be corroborated based on both the 
regular shaped objects consistent with WFP-size grain sacks, as well as the irregular-shaped objects consistent 
with unknown debris, present in the streets and loaded on to vehicles in close proximity to the facility. UN 
reports confirm the looting of 800 metric tons of food and medical supplies from the facility.54
Figure 2.2. Apparent Targeting of Humanitarian Actors and Looting of Humanitarian 
Supplies. (Alleged Perpetrator Action 2). Images courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
11 February 2011. QuickBird-2 satellite. 26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
During the invasion, imagery revealed the presence of armored vehicles and towed artillery consistent 
with units known to be employed by SAF. The above image shows three T-55 main battle tanks loaded onto 
heavy equipment transports (HETs), as well as four additional T-55’s off-loaded and facing southward.55 
Also facing southward are three pieces of unhitched 105mm artillery guns and an armored infantry-fighting 
vehicle, also consistent with the SAF force profile (Figure 2.3).
The positioning of the artillery in a southward direction, toward southern Sudan, is dispositive forensic 
evidence that those observables are likely controlled by SAF at the time the image was captured.  At that time, 
SAF troops were reportedly moving due south at that time towards SPLA positions along the River Kiir.56  The 
artillery appears to be facing in that vector to provide fire support, if needed, in the direction of the SPLA 
frontline.  
Figure 2.3 Apparent Forcible Military Control of an Area. (Alleged Perpetrator Action 3). Image 
courtesy of DigitalGlobe.
26 May 2011. WorldView-2 satellite.
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Suggestions for Further Research
As the Abyei Town incident case study is intended to demonstrate, MARS analysis can be approached in 
a systematic and standardized way that relies on the iterative comparison of accepted examples of past practice 
over time.  The approaches articulated herein should be studied and built upon through further research that 
will require the committed involvement of expertise and resources from a diverse community of entities. 
These actors may include academic institutions, human rights and humanitarian NGOs, international legal 
experts and bodies, governments, private business, and most importantly, the communities affected by mass 
atrocities themselves.  
If such research is pursued, MARS may eventually have a place in mass atrocity investigations as its own 
formalized profession.  As a result, MARS may be able to play a similar to the role that DNA analysis, ballistics, 
forensic anthropology, or any number of traditional forensic sciences currently play in multiple domestic and 
international criminal justice settings.  
Examples of best practices should be both identified and created where required.  This effort should 
occur across various mass atrocity contexts, geographic regions, and operational objectives (i.e., collection of 
evidence for accountability versus early warning, etc.) for MARS to become a truly scalable tool.   
Component pieces that may eventually provide a common forensic methodology for MARS should 
include, though are not limited to, the following:  
• A common approach for the standard identification of potentially relevant observable objects, 
likely visual properties and/or phenomena associated with those objects, and tested methods to 
aid in their identification;
• Accepted methods for the identification and testing of apparent activity patterns to determine 
whether they are consistent with an alleged mass atrocity event type and/or alleged perpetrator 
action; 
• The creation of a common, publicly accessible repository for MARS evidence examples to be 
presented and critiqued by practitioners. Such an evidence repository may also require the 
agreement of an annotation method, taxonomy, and presentation guidelines for collecting and 
storing these examples that should be common to the field;
• Development of common standards for creating, field testing, and evaluating algorithmic feature 
extraction applications for the automated identification of MARS related phenomena in imagery. 
The continuing development of algorithmic feature extraction programs presents potential 
challenges and opportunities for the MARS space that will have to be assessed;
• Research into how remote sensing in mass atrocity contexts may either protect or endanger 
vulnerable populations or physical evidence on-the-ground, particularly human remains found in 
mass graves.  Related inquiry should occur into determining whether remote surveillance of alleged 
perpetrators has any causal relationship to changes in the behavior of these actors in any way;
• The integration and cross-referencing of international humanitarian and human rights law 
(IHHRL) standards, particularly the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute, with MARS 
examples of forensic evidence.  This research effort may require interdisciplinary collaboration 
between the MARS community and IHHRL experts to develop a common reference for forensic 
examples of alleged war crimes, including genocide.
Significant challenges, however, will have to be overcome to further develop, agree upon, and disseminate 
a forensic science specific to MARS.  The difficulty in accessing sources of geospatial data of alleged mass 
atrocity acts and related operational patterns has plagued the field for some time.  The often exorbitant cost 
of high-resolution satellite imagery, as well as a limited number of high-resolution satellites available to 
proactively task, have been major barriers to the advancement of this field.
Innovations to remote sensing, including the deployment of “micro-satellites”, which are often less 
costly to build, maintain and replace, may offer potential remedies to some of these longstanding barriers to 
affordable, recently acquired data.57  
However, new, less costly technologies alone may likely not be enough to support the evolution of this 
subfield of remote sensing into an established forensic science. Proportionate investment in the agreement of 
common standards, methods, evidence examples, and the training and development of practitioners is also 
simultaneously required.   
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Remote sensing offers potentially powerful insights into the alleged mass atrocities perpetrators commit 
in some of the world’s most inaccessible environments. It is incumbent upon researchers and practitioners 
of MARS to begin the difficult yet necessary process of becoming more than simply one application of this 
technology, but instead, a constant process of scientific innovation.
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